您书中（Washington’s China）讲，从40到60年代，一开始美国政府把中国看做是当时苏联的“傀儡”，之后是中苏集团中“独立的小伙伴”，再后来是“革命典型”和第三世界动荡的助推器。您认为，当前，美国政府把中国看成什么？
我想基本上，美国对中国的主要担忧来自于中国是一个极度独立的国家，并一直在探索、追求属于它自己的发展之路。现在，由于美国是超级大国这一本质，它对于别国的独立发展非常敌视。撒奇尔夫人有句老话，“你别无选择”。尽管美国政府偶尔会默许别国有其独特的发展选择，但大多数情况下，他们对此还是持批判、担忧并敌视的态度。我想中国就是其中一个代表，不仅在独立方面是一个代表，在那些把这个世界推向多极化的国家中，中国也是一个代表。越来越多的南部国家追求独立，这对他们来说很不易，还有很长的发展之路要走，但是中国已经步入发展的正轨。但作为超级大国的美国对这些发展极其批判。
您反复提到“hostility（敌意）”一词，您笔下暗示美对中的敌意要远高于中对美的敌意，为什么是这样？
当美国被指对中国采取的行动是由于敌视时，尤其是偏向美国政府的历史学家总会说“可中国对美国也敌视”，并且这种情况从1949年后就一直出现。在1949年后，中国国内对于中美关系的走向确实也有很强烈的争议。但是现实是，冷战期间有很多关键时刻，比如在50年代的万隆会议上，以及60年代的其他场合，中国政府明确地表示他们希望得到更多的承认，希望在联合国有自己的一席之地，这些都被美国不公地拒绝了。在中国的各种声明中，你随便拿出来一篇，或者看看埃德加·斯诺在他人生不同阶段对毛主席进行的采访，或是周恩来和其他中国领导人的声明，你会发现，中国才是一直希望对外开放的那个，而不是美国，并且直到尼克松和基辛格访华，美国才开始开放。在越南战争时期，在美国民众对美国政府的一片异见声中，在遏制中国的政策让越来越多美国人担忧时，他们迈出了这一步。但在某种程度上，美国政府对中国的敌视依然存在，所以我刚提到了中国的独立，真正的独立让美国敌视。但是正如我前面所讲，这种敌视也表现在美国人充满优越感和傲慢自大的语言、腔调上，举另一个例子——美国伟大的非洲裔领袖马丁·路德·金曾经说过，美国自大的本质在于他们相信，世界上任何其他国家都需要美国去教，而从其他国家那里没什么可学。而我的想法是，如果美国不能从其他国家那里学到知识，那么他就不会和其他国家和谐相处，中国就是这些国家中重要的一个。
那您又如何看待“中国威胁论”？
从1945年成为超级大国后的美国政策可以看出，美国的信念就是它应该是全世界的支点，美国精神就是普世价值，并且最终，其他国家都要使自己适应于这一价值。美国在为自己说话，我想这是从外宣的角度，我认为根本上，普世价值并不能反映美国历史，但是这一价值体现了美国的人文理想，如果其他国家不能践行这一价值，就会被美国认为是欠合理的、欠发达的、缺少教养的、不精明的。
中国根据自己的国情，根据自己复杂的文化，长久以来一直在为独立而奋斗，独立后的现在，长期努力探索社会转型，以解决面临的问题，比如如何让个人生活更加美好、更有质量，如何处理污染问题。但是随着中国的发展，它却形成了非常不同于美国的发展之路，它不会成为美国效仿的对象，也不应该是，不能是。但是，找到适合自己的道路是非常艰辛的，这也启发其他国家，不是去复制中国，而是找到属于自己国家的发展之路。但这对于美国来说是个担忧，因为这些国家追求一个多极世界，而美国不想支持这一追求，因为多极世界不能让美国的权利得以发挥。
美国是一个超级大国，一个我们从未见过的超级大国，战争后的历史原因让它出世，这些原因包括其他大国被破坏。美国能大大重组日本和欧洲的经济，所以这些国家依然默许美国政权对他们的干涉。他们会抱怨，他们会争论，他们持异议，会担心，但根本上，他们在某些方面依旧和美国绑在一起，同时也不安于南部国家的发展还要走多远。中国是整个历史环境中的一部分，存在中国本身的问题，也存在美国投射给中国的问题。
[Transcript]
I think basically the US’ main concern about China is that it is profoundly independent country that is seeking pursue its own means of development. Now the US, given the nature of its being a super power, has been very hostile to a range of independent kind of development. There is the old line that Margaret Thatcher used to use TINA-there is no alternative. And the American government though it appears at times to be acquiescent to alternative ways of developing. In most ways, it is very critical, uneasy and hostile to this. So I think what China now is representative of, its both independent in of itself, but it is also representative of those countries, forces in the world, that are moving towards a more multipolar world. And those countries in the south, that have not been able to emerge easily are increasingly doing so, it’s gonna be a long period of time as it develops, but China is on that historical trajectory I think. And the US, as a super power, is profoundly critical of these developments.
People often ,particularly historians in the US government, they always like to say when it’s pointed out that the US is hostile or takes acts that other people might consider hostile, “oh but the Chinese are hostile”. And this runs throughout the entire history of the relations since 1949. Now there were obviously very strong feeling in China after 1949 about the US relations would be. But in reality, there were key moments throughout the Cold War were there was a time that Bandung Conference in the 1950s, other moments in 1960s, when the Chinese government clearly signaled they were open to its recognition, they were open towards taking their seat in the UN, which have been so unjustly rejected by the US. So whatever one takes out some of the statements that came out of China, if you read many of Chairman Mao’s interviews with Edgar Snow at different time in his life, take some of the statements that Zhou Enlai and others made, you will see the Chinese were the ones who were willing to make the openings, not the US, and it was not until Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger took the step that they did, in the context one might note, of the Vietnam War, of huge public opposition in the US, growing uneasiness about the containment of China, that they took that step. But the hostility in a way still remains, and so I’ve mentioned it in terms what I think the independence is, true independences is about. But as I said earlier, it’s also there in the language; it’s there in the tone, and it’s there in a certain arrogance and as another example, the great African American leader Dr. Martin Luther King, used to say the essence of the American arrogance was the belief that it had everything to teach the world, and nothing to learn from it. The core of what I believe is if Americans can’t learn from the world of which China is such a critical part, they will not come to terms with that world.
I think if you look at what American policy is since 1945 as a super power, it’s a conviction that the US should be the pivot in every region of the world, that its ethos is universalistic one, and that other countries should ultimately adapt to aspects of that ethos. You know the US speaks for itself now, I think a propagandistic perception, I don’t think that is fundamentally what American history is about, but this vision of American and embodies humanities’ ideals, and other countries unless they live up to them somehow are to be judged as less legitimate or less developed, or less cultured, less sophisticated, and I think China is, by its size, its cultural sophistication, its long struggle to be independent, and now, within that independence, to figure out, having struggled so long to get it, what kind of society can deal with the problems they face, and those problems, everything from a better personal life, to get your quality, to dealing with pollution…But as China continues to develop, it is suggestive of a very different way of development to the US, its not gonna be a model of the US, it shouldn’t be, it can’t be.
